Question submitted by Amanda:
This is a question about the law-of-nature model used in science. Etienne Wegner argued in an article written in the sixties and available on line that it was only relatively simple (not easy) things that are the subject of natural laws because laws can be articulated for only those things for which the relevant conditions are itemizable and thus controllable. Complexity thus presents a challenge to a laws of nature model. (I’m not thinking of stochastics, obviously.) A law of nature is a statement of a pattern of nature that leaves out any reference to the circumstances (ICs) of a place, because it can. But it can because there aren’t any relevant ICs. There are plenty of phenomena, therefore, for which a law of nature model is not appropriate. It seems that scientists (physicists and non-systems biologists) aren’t giving much thought to these deep paradigmatic implications of complexity. My question is, is the reason for this lacuna because they’re locked into a reductionist paradigm or is it because of the spin that they have to do for simple non-scientists who pour out research funds in R&D projects? A related question is about “fundamental particles.” Is it really possible to explain human society as the effect of little bits of matter bumping up against each other collectively, or does the collectiveness not add many other dimensions of causality?
Response by John Verdon:
This is a great question, and of course that means it’s not an easy one to answer. But here is my view in two parts.
First, I think we must make a distinction between a ‘law of nature’ and predictability. For example, let’s look at the weather, which is a fully deterministic system – by which I mean that all the variables involved (e.g. temperature, humidity, density, condensates and particles, masses -land/water, etc.) all transpire and interact according to well known and understood ‘laws of nature’ (e.g. thermodynamics, classical physics, etc.). Now despite it being fully deterministic we cannot predict the weather because of what is known (and perhaps can also be considered a law of nature) as sensitivity to initial conditions. This has been popularly known as the ‘butterfly effect’ – the flapping of the wings of a butterfly in China, could ultimately result in a hurricane in Florida. Thus a fully deterministic series of causes and effects (like weather, ecosystem, market) based on ‘laws of nature’ yet remaining completely unpredictable – and therefore appearing to be an ‘unlawful’ system. It is important to note that improvements in weather forecasting are based not so much on ‘prediction’ as they are on better methods of observing the current state through such things as satellite imagery.
This means that we essentially don’t know how small a difference makes a difference and the contrary how big a difference makes no difference. Read More »
Ask a Scientist: The Law-of-Nature Model
Question submitted by Amanda:
This is a question about the law-of-nature model used in science. Etienne Wegner argued in an article written in the sixties and available on line that it was only relatively simple (not easy) things that are the subject of natural laws because laws can be articulated for only those things for which the relevant conditions are itemizable and thus controllable. Complexity thus presents a challenge to a laws of nature model. (I’m not thinking of stochastics, obviously.) A law of nature is a statement of a pattern of nature that leaves out any reference to the circumstances (ICs) of a place, because it can. But it can because there aren’t any relevant ICs. There are plenty of phenomena, therefore, for which a law of nature model is not appropriate. It seems that scientists (physicists and non-systems biologists) aren’t giving much thought to these deep paradigmatic implications of complexity. My question is, is the reason for this lacuna because they’re locked into a reductionist paradigm or is it because of the spin that they have to do for simple non-scientists who pour out research funds in R&D projects? A related question is about “fundamental particles.” Is it really possible to explain human society as the effect of little bits of matter bumping up against each other collectively, or does the collectiveness not add many other dimensions of causality?
Response by John Verdon:
This is a great question, and of course that means it’s not an easy one to answer. But here is my view in two parts.
First, I think we must make a distinction between a ‘law of nature’ and predictability. For example, let’s look at the weather, which is a fully deterministic system – by which I mean that all the variables involved (e.g. temperature, humidity, density, condensates and particles, masses -land/water, etc.) all transpire and interact according to well known and understood ‘laws of nature’ (e.g. thermodynamics, classical physics, etc.). Now despite it being fully deterministic we cannot predict the weather because of what is known (and perhaps can also be considered a law of nature) as sensitivity to initial conditions. This has been popularly known as the ‘butterfly effect’ – the flapping of the wings of a butterfly in China, could ultimately result in a hurricane in Florida. Thus a fully deterministic series of causes and effects (like weather, ecosystem, market) based on ‘laws of nature’ yet remaining completely unpredictable – and therefore appearing to be an ‘unlawful’ system. It is important to note that improvements in weather forecasting are based not so much on ‘prediction’ as they are on better methods of observing the current state through such things as satellite imagery.
This means that we essentially don’t know how small a difference makes a difference and the contrary how big a difference makes no difference. Read More »